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IN 'TH·E SUP.R.EME C01URT 
of the 
STATE OF U'TAH 
HENRY CHILD, (. 
Plaintiff and App.ellant, 
vs. 
COY J. HAYWARD and l 
ALDIN 0. HAYWARD, ( 
Defendants and Respondents.) 
RESPONDEN·T·'S BRIE~F 
~Case 
No. 
9082 
STATE~MENT OF T'HE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action wherein plaintiff asks for rescission 
of a uniform real estate contract, or damages in the 
alternative, and for the definition of a boundary line 
between the property of the parties. 
The case was tried by the ~Court. At the conclusion 
of plaintiff's evidence defendants made a motion for 
judgment dismissing plaintiff's complaint and granting 
defendant's counterclaim for specific performance of 
the uniform real estate contract, and defining the 
boundary between the property of the parties. This 
motion was granted, and plaip.tiff has appealed. 
RE~LIE~F SOl TGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants and respondents ask that th<~ Court 
affirm the judgment of the trial court. 
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2 
STATEMENT OF F A~CTS 
In the summel' of 1957, defendant, Aldin Hayward, 
and his attorney, Wendell Harnmond, visited property 
at the northeast corner of the intersection of Orchard 
Drive and 6300 South (also known as \~irginia Lane) 
in the 'City of Bountiful, ('11 • ±9) and discussed the 
possibility of acquiring the vroperty and building a store 
thereon (T. 10). Later, Aldin Hayward began purchas-
ing the various parcels in the area ( T. 9). At the ti1ue, 
plaintiff Henry Child owned property contiguous to 
that which Aldin Hayward was acquiring, and plaintiff 
knew of Aldin Hayward's negotiations with other prop-
erty owners in the area ( T. 15, 23, 28, 32, 33, 41, 67). 
In March or April of 1958, Aldin Hayward contacted 
plaintiff and offered to buy some of his land ( T. 11). 
Plaintiff was then living in the vicinity of the parcel in 
question ( T. 12,) and could see it from his residence 
(T. 106). The two men had three or four discussions 
about a possible sale (T. 12), and walked over the parcel 
together (T. 13, 15, 18). Finally, on an evening in April, 
1958 -probably April 4, (T. 42, 43, 126, 142 defendant's 
exhibits 1, 5, and 10) -· plaintiff agreed to sell to 
Aldin Hayward a parcel bound by a line starting at the 
rear of the Eugene Child lot, even with a concrete wall 
on the east side of said lot, and running north to the 
old Winegar fence, west to a tract which Aldin Hayward 
had recently acquired from plaintiff's ex-wife, south 
to the rear of the Wallace 'Child lot, and east to the 
point of beginning. (T. 19, 39, 40, 52, ·55, 5·6, 58, 157). 
The original agreed purchase price was $2,000.00 (T. 
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20, -10). The parties iunnecliately went to the home of 
.. Attorney VVendell Ha1nmond to have their agreement 
put in writing ('1 1• 20, 49). Plaintiff there reneged on 
the original pureltase price and insisted on $2,500.00. 
Aldin Hayward agreed to the increase ( T·. 20, 41). 
They described to the attorney the area of the parcel 
to be conveyed, and after an infor1nal handwritten Inem-
oranduin was prepared, they signed it. Aldin Hayward 
paid plaintiff $100.00 that night ( T. 16, 25, 50). 
Mr. Hanunond thereafter prepared a forinal con-
tract for the parties to sign ( T. 51), with a description 
based on the section corner which had been recently re-
located by the United States Government (T. 51, 160). 
The plaintiff had p~reviously deeded property using that 
same relocated section corner as a base (T·. 164). Never-
the less, he objected to the description on the contract 
first prepared by Mr. Haininond (T. 53), so Mr. Ham-
mond prepared another formal contract using the old 
description (T. 5·6. 58). After the contract was pre-
pared, plaintiff insisted that the concrete wall be refer-
red to in the description and this reference was added 
to the contract (T. 58, 112, 115, 11~6, 157). Aldin Hay-
ward and plaintiff signed the contract at Mr. Hanunond's 
office and then they took it to the Hayward store where 
Coy Hayward, who had entered into the transaction as 
a buyer, also signed (T . .+:),59, 65, 66). 
The contract (defendant's Exhibit l) contained the 
following provision: 
When buyers receive deed fro1n seller, they 
agree to convey to Eugene Child the south 45 
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feet of said tract, by 122 feet east and \Vest, \Vith-
out compensation therefor. 
This provision was inserted at plaintiff's direction and 
with defendant's approval (T. '27, 61, 113, 120 to 122, 
156). Eugene Child is plaintiff's son. Plaintiff never 
disclosed his reasons for \\:anting to pass the 45 by 122 
fot tract to Eugene by this rnethod, although a nuin-
ber of possible reasons appear fron1 the evidence ( T. 22, 
61, 135). 
On April 9, 1958, five days after the parties signed 
the first memorandum, Aldin Hayward entered into a 
written agreement with Eugene ~Child and his wife, 
for the purchase from them of the 45 x 122 foot tract 
above referred to, and the rear 21 feet of the Eugene 
;Child lot ( T. 29 to 31, 35, 44, 45; defendants' E~hibit 9). 
In the latter part of March or early April, 1959, 
defendants tendered to plaintiff the first annual pay-
ment due under the contract, by a check dated March 
26, 1959, in the amount of $580.00. Plaitiff endorsed 
this check, and it was paid at the defendants' bank on 
April 1, 1959 (T. 142; defendants' Exhibit 5). Almost 
3-1/2 years elapsed bet\Yeen the date the contract was 
made and the time plaintiff gave notice to rescind ( T. 
143; plaintiffs' Exhibit C). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE QUESTION OF A CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST AND 
UND'ELIVERED GIFT ARE RAISED FOR iT'HE FIRST TIME 
APPEAL AND CANNOT BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. 
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This Court cannot pass on Inatters which were not 
raised in the trial court, but are raised for the first 
tiine on appeal. Huber vs. Deep Creek Irrigation Com-
pany, 6 Utah 2d 15, .305 P.2d 478 (1956); Pettingill vs. 
Perkins, :2 Utah 2d :266, 27:2 P.2d 185 (1954); North 
Salt Lake vs. St. Joseph Water & Irr. co., 118 Utah 600, 
~23 P.2d 577 ( 1950). 
wit: 
Plaintiff's co1nplaint sets forth -! causes of action, to 
A. Rescission of the ~contract for fraud. 
B. Dan1ages in the alternative to rescission. 
C. Defenition of a boundary line between the prop-
perty of plaintiff and defendants. 
These causes of action were further explained in 
the pre-trial order, which \\Tas prepared by the attorney 
for the plaintiff (T. 50 to 53). At the trial plaintiff 
abandoned his forth cause of action. 
The questions of constructive trust and undelivered 
gift were raised at no time until the filing of plaintiff's 
brief in this Court. These questions, therefore, cannot 
be considered by this ~Court. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE THE ELEMENTS OF 
ACTIONABLE FRAUD, AND THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT 
ERR IN GRANTING JUDGMENT FOR THE DEFENDANTS. 
The case of Stuck vs. Delta Land & Water Company, 
63 Utah 495, 227 Pac. 791 ( 1924), sets forth the nine 
basic elements of actionable fraud. They are: 
1. A representation. 
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2. Its falsity. 
3. Its materiality 
4. The speaker's kno\vledge of its falsity or ignor-
ance of its truth. 
5. His intent that it should be acted upon by the 
person and in the manner reasonably conteln-
plated. 
6. The hearer's ignorance of its falsity. 
7. I-Iis reliance upon its truth. 
8. His right to rely thereon. 
9. His consequent and proximate injury. 
For further discusion of these principles see Pace 
vs. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952); Oberg 
vs. Sanders, 111 Utah 507, 184 P.2d 229· (1947); Auer-
bach vs. Santuels, 10 Utah 2d 152, 349 P.2d 1112 (19·60). 
The party asking for rescission of an executory 
contract on the basis of fraud must, therefore, show that 
he was induced to part with some legal right, or was 
induced to assume some legal liability, \Yhich he other-
wise would not have done but for the fraudulent repre-
sentations which induced the making of the contract. 
17A C.J. S. Contracts, Sec. 418 (1). 
Plaintiff has failed to prove a single element of 
actionable fraud, and did not prove that he parted with 
a legal right or assun1ed a legal right. 
There \vas no misleading of plaintiff by defendants. 
It was plaintiff's O\Vn idea to convey the 45 x 122 foot 
tract to Eugene Child in the 1nanner agreed on (T. 27, 
61, 113, 120, 122, 156). Defendants neither said anything 
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nor did anything to induce plaintiff to part with his land 
in this fashion. Plaintiff's clai1n CCo1nplaint R. 2) that 
defendants "did thereby deprive the plaintiff from an 
honest and full payment for the tract," and also "of 
the right to dispose of this tract according to his own 
desires" is baseless and false. 
Plaintiff's disenchantn1ent with the contract ap-
parently aros e from the fact that his son, Eugene, 
spurned his offering, and turned around and sold the 
tract to the Haywards. His own testimony is susceptible 
of no other interpretation. On examination by his at-
torney, he stated that he accepted the first annual pay-
Inent on the contract and that he refused the second 
annual payment. When asked by his attorney to tell 
why he refused the second annual payment, he said it 
was because he had been deceived, that he had learned 
something from the development of the project and 
that it appeared that the 45 x 122 foot tract was going 
to go to the Haywards (T. 80 to 82). He acknowledged 
that the construction work which supposedly tipped hin1 
off was begun "first thing" after the contract was signed 
(T. 81), that same spring and summer (T. 141), and he 
claims that he went to Coy Hayward and told him he 
wanted to return the $500.00 and cancel the contract. 
But he didn't tell Coy Hayward \\'hy ('~e. 82, 99, 100). 
Yet when the first annual pay1nent was tendered to him 
some eight months later, he accepted it without protest. 
He did send Mr. Hammond back to get interest added 
to the check, but he expressed no other objection ('Jl. 80, 
81). His testimony, therefore, that he expressed inuned-
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iate dissatisfaction with the contract, is \\'holly unbeliPv-
able. 
On the strength of plaintiff's agree1nent to convey 
the 45 x 122 foot tract to Eugene ·Child and the knowl-
edge that they could deal \\'i th Eugene and Wallace 
·Child, not only on that tract but on other property, de-
fendants have made and carried out their plans and have 
changed their position. Additionally, they have given 
consideration to Eugene ( T. 183, 184; defendants' Ex-
hibit 4). Plaintiff, on the other hand, has suffered no 
damage or change of position whatsoever as a result 
of the transaction between defendants and Eugene Child. 
He contracted to convey the land to defendants who 
would then convey to Eugene. They stand ready and 
willing to do this. Defendants were not to receive any 
consideration fron1 Eugene for so doing. Nor was plain-
tiff to receive any consideration from Eugene (T. 144). 
Further, plaintiff did not intend to retain any control 
over the property nor exercise any restraint as to what 
Eugene might do with it. For example from page 144 
of the transcript: 
Q. Now, Mr. ~Child, this 45 x 122 foot tract was 
to have been given to Eugene and not sold 
to him; is that correct~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. You didn't intend to sell it to him or receive 
consideration fro1n hin1 for it; did you~ 
A. No. 
Q. And it 'vasn't your intention to keep control 
of the property after you gave it to him 
was it~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
A. Why no. I gave hirn property where his 
house is. But if conditions developed that it 
was to his advantage and profit, if he wanted 
to sell it, of course he could sell it. Yes. 
Q. You didn't care what he did with it after he 
got it; did you~ 
A. Well, it wasn't 1ny place to tell hin1 \vhat 
he was to do with it, no. I gave it to him to 
use it according to his best judgment, as he 
wanted to. 
Q. He was free to do with it as he pleased, then; 
is that correct~ 
A. That is correct. 
and again at page 149: 
Q. Mr. Child, in accordance with your testimony 
that Eugene was free to do what he wanted 
with this property, I guess he could have 
leased it; couldn't he~ 
A. Yes, after it was his property. 
Q. He could have lease it for five years if he 
wanted to, or three years~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Or 99 years~ 
A. Whatever he wanted to do with it. 
and at page 150 : 
Q. I call your attention again, Mr. 1Child, to your 
deposition taken on August 9, 1962, page 28, 
your answer to a question concerning your 
reason for wanting to rescind this property. 
It was as follows. Reading from line 15: 
(reading) "No, that isn't the reason. lVfy 
reason for wanting to, what do you call it, 
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rescind that contract is because of the deal 
they have with Eugene on the 45 feet by 122 
feet, which was defiinitely contrary to 1ny 
idea and purpose." Now, that \Vas the prob-
lem wasn't it~ 
A. Well, yes. That is ''That I have been saying 
all the time, that it was not according to my 
ideas concerning the property. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff entered into a written contract to sell a 
parcel of land to defendants for a price. The contract 
was tailor-made to suit plaintiff. The parcel included 
a smaller tract which plaintiff wanted defendants to 
convey, without charge, to his son. Defendants wanted 
the smaller tract and felt that they could deal with the 
son and acquire it. They did in fact deal with the son, 
after making their agreement with the plaintiff. 
For reasons not entirely clear, plaintiff gave notice 
of rescission about 3-1/:2 years after the contract was 
entered into, and then filed suit on the ground of fraud. 
At the trial plaintiff not only failed to bring forward 
evidence of all the ele1nents of fraud but failed to prove 
any single element of fraud. 
In looking at the entire transaction as a \vhole, we 
have a situation where plaintiff contracted to sell prop-
erty to defendants, and defendants agreed to re-convey 
the propert~~ to plaintiff's son. Defendants stand ready 
and '''"illing to do just that. l:>laintiff cannot complain 
if his son thereafter rP-eonveys the property to defend-
ants. 
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Respondents therefore respectfully subinit that the 
judgment of the Trial'Court should be affirmed and that 
:hey should have their costs on appeal. 
Respectfully submitted 
K. Roger Bean 
John H. Allen 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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